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Executive Summary 
 
This paper reviews both the theoretical underpinnings and the empirical 
evidence in support of the under-provision of training. Under-provision in a 
market economy occurs when training is below its efficient level, which equalizes 
marginal social benefits to marginal social costs. With perfectly competitive labor 
markets, there is under-provision of training if individuals are liquidity constrained 
or if there are legal constraints, such as minimum wages, which do not allow 
workers to accept a sufficiently low initial wage. Under-provision also emerges 
when individuals are not fully rational or perfectly informed, for instance because 
they are too “present-oriented” or short-sighted to the point of not being able to 
perceive the benefits of training in terms of future earnings. Additional problems 
emerge if returns to training are uncertain, and when renegotiation between the 
parties takes place after the investment.   
Labor market imperfections preclude the possibility that the investing individual 
can reap the full returns of her investment, and generate scope for under-
investment in human capital. Since general training often benefits future 
employers, who in imperfect labor markets do not pay for the full marginal 
product of workers, the level of investment undertaken by the current firm cannot 
be optimal. If quit rates are positive and firms in the market pay less than 
productivity, outside firms earn a profit from training, which is not considered by 
training firms when deciding whether to invest. This poaching externality reduces 
the incentive to train. 
We argue in the paper that, if firms invest in general training, important 
evidence on under-provision can be obtained by looking at the relationship 
between investment in training and turnover. On the one hand, a positive 
relationship reduces the marginal benefits of training with respect to the first best, 
with negative effects on training. On the other hand, a negative relationship can 
compensate other sources of under-provision and close or even eliminate the gap 
between efficient and actual training outcomes. We find evidence of a statistically 
significant and positive relationship between employer  – provided training and   3
subsequent turnover for Denmark, Belgium, France and the UK. In the remaining 
countries the relationship is either not statistically significant or negative and 
statistically significant, as in the case of Finland. The evidence that in no country, 
except Finland, training significantly decreases the quit rate is suggestive of 
under-provision. 
Policies which aim at increasing the level of training above the market level 
should be designed to affect either supply or demand, or both. In this review, we 
focus on supply policies, which directly affect firms but also have repercussions 
on the demand side. Broadly speaking, supply policies can affect employer  – 
provided training at the margin if they influence marginal benefits and marginal 
costs. We classify training policies as policies targeted to marginal benefits and 
policies targeted at marginal costs. Among the former we discuss payback clauses 
and apprenticeship contracts and among the latter levy/grant schemes, train or 
pay schemes and tax deductions. 
These policies are motivated by under-provision, that is, by a level of 
training below the efficient level. A different issue is the equitable distribution of 
training opportunities. Since human capital is an important source of income and 
job satisfaction, an equitable allocation would require some redistribution in favor 
of groups of individuals who are less likely to be trained. The key question here is 
whether economic policy should try to correct outcomes – differences in training – 
or to modify initial conditions which produce efficiently different outcomes – for 
instance differences in educational attainment. While important, this issue is 
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Introduction   
 
Human capital, accumulated at school or in the labor market, is a key 
determinant of wages and employment opportunities (Lynch, 1992; Bishop, 1997, 
Booth et al. 1999, OECD, 1999; Dearden et al., 2000; Ok and Tergeist, 2003) and 
an important factor affecting economic growth (De la Fuente e Ciccone, 2002; 
OECD, 2001). Skill upgrading and the avoidance of skill obsolescence are relevant 
features of policies designed to increase labor market participation and the length 
of the working life and to reduce the social exclusion of particular groups and the 
consequences of population ageing.  
Since many professional activities require skills that can only be acquired by 
direct experience, substantial investment in human capital takes place on-the-job 
rather than at schools or in specialized institutions. In this review paper we focus 
on training provided by firms. Many empirical studies show that there is 
substantial variation across countries and across socio-economic groups in 
training participation rates, with Nordic countries showing higher participation 
than Southern European countries (Ok and Tergeist, 2003) and low-educated and 
older workers generally participating less than other groups in training activities. 
Are these differences due to inefficiencies? More generally, do enterprises and 
workers invest enough in training? Although there is a large consensus in the 
economic literature on the importance of training, there is less agreement on 
whether the observed levels of investment in training are efficient. 
The paper is organized as follows: in the first section we review the theoretical 
literature on under-provision; in the second section, we discuss the available 
empirical evidence, and in the last section we consider policy implications.  
   
1. The under-provision of training: theory 
 
Under  – provision can only be defined with respect to a benchmark. The 
natural benchmark is the efficient level of training, which maximizes total output 
net of t raining costs. Equality of (private and social) marginal benefits and   5
marginal costs does not imply that the efficient level of training is the same across 
different groups of individuals or countries. For instance, the poorly educated may 
face higher training costs because education and training are complements. Given 
marginal benefits, this group should receive less training. Therefore, the 
observation that the poorly educated receive less training than the better 
educated is not by itself evidence of inefficient under-provision. However, if the 
objective function pursued by the policy maker is a social welfare function rather 
than simply net output, and if the social planner cares about equality, then a 
significant dispersion of training across groups is not socially optimal even if it 
maximizes net output.  
Of course, the level of training of individuals with lower educational attainment 
might be depressed below the first best level by other factors, such as higher 
turnover rates and more binding liquidity constraints. Similarly, some countries 
might invest too little in training because of labor market institutions. In these 
situations we have a case for under-provision. Inefficiencies can occur because of 
externalities, so that the private and the social benefits of training do not coincide. 
One possibility is that training an employee not only increases her productivity, 
but also the productivity of co-workers. The size of these externalities can vary 
across industries and local labor markets.  
In this s ection we organize the review of the existing theories of under  – 
provision in two sub- sections, which cover perfectly and imperfectly competitive 
labor markets respectively. 
  
1.1. Perfectly competitive labor markets 
 
Becker, 1962, develops the dominant economic framework for the analysis of 
the investment in human capital when labor markets are perfectly competitive. 
The distinction between firm specific and general human capital plays a crucial 
role in defining who bears the investment cost. Since the investment in general 
human capital increases the recipient’s productivity in all firms operating in the 
market, the firm currently employing the worker will not be prepared to finance   6
this kind of investment in the absence of an enforceable contract. Because 
workers fully capture the benefits of training via higher wages, they will undertake 
the efficient level of investment in general skills and pay for it either directly or by 
accepting lower wages during the training period. 
When training is firm specific, the costs and revenues are shared by the worker 
and the firm (Becker, 1964; Hashimoto, 1981). This result is based on the fact 
that the investment is lost if the worker and the firm separate after training. In 
contrast with the case of general training in a perfectly competitive labour market, 
this creates a wedge between the worker’s productivity - which increases with 
training  - and her outside option – which does not. To avoid quits the firm is 
willing to pay the trained worker a wage higher than her outside option, but below 
the worker’s productivity. Therefore, the optimal contract implies that costs are 
shared as well.  
Hashimoto, 1981, formally shows that the shares of cost paid by the firm and 
the worker depend on the relationship between quit rates and wages, layoff rates 
and profits, and on other variables such as the cost of funds and the attitude 
toward risk of the parties involved. He also shows that the level of training 
investment is ex-ante efficient, even in the presence of ex-post inefficient 
turnover. In the starting period the firm and the worker choose the level of 
specific training to maximize their expected net returns. With the assumption of 
free entry and in the absence of externalities this choice leads to efficient 
investment. 
In this framework the efficient level of training depends on marginal costs and 
returns. Conditional on benefits, subjects who bear lower marginal training costs 
undertake higher investments. According to Rosen, 1976, Mincer, 1962, and 
Heckman, 2000, education plays an important role in providing basic skills, and 
improves the ability of individuals  to learn other competencies in a variety of 
professional fields. Since learning begets learning, there is complementarity 
between education and training. A consequence of complementarity is that better 
educated individuals are more involved in both general and specific training, with 
undesirable implications for the equity of labor market outcomes: rather than   7
compensating the existing differences produced by educational attainment, 
training widens these differences.   
Notice, however, that a substitution effect between education and training 
cannot be excluded. If a given level of human capital is required for a job, this 
level could be attained either by providing more formal education or by on – the – 
job training. The distinction between more formal off – the – job training (OFFJT) 
and on – the – job training (OJT) appears to be crucial when discussing the 
relationship between education and training. Lynch, 1992, uses US data and finds 
that education is positively and significantly related to the former type of training, 
but unrelated to the latter. Focusing on the concept of over-education, Sicherman, 
1990, finds that over-educated individuals receive less OJT than individuals with 
lower education and interprets this result as evidence that education and OJT are 
substitutes in the production of human capital. Since over-educated workers are 
more likely to quit and move to a more suitable job, employers are less willing to 
train them in firm  – specific skills. Hersch, 1991, obtains similar results and 
argues that the over-educated are less willing, or less able, to learn than 
individuals with the suitable level of education. Finally, Ariga and Brunello, 2003, 
study a  sample of Thai and Filipino workers and find evidence that the 
complementarity between education and training is limited to OFFJT. 
Another important aspect in the determination of the efficient level of training 
investment is the temporal horizon. Training returns accrue to the parties for a 
shorter period when subjects involved in training activities are older. On the one 
hand, older individuals should invest less in training than younger workers. On the 
other hand, older employees may suffer of education obsolescence. If education 
and training are complements, education obsolescence should generate less 
training for the old; if they are substitutes, older workers should be trained more 
to compensate for the decline in their human capital.  
The length of the period during which skills acquired through training are 
used productively depends not only on the recipient’s age but also on her labor 
market status. Acquired skills can be used in the production process only when 
the trained worker is employed. Therefore, individuals who expect to be   8
unemployed some time in the future are less willing to invest in training. This 
implies that workers with temporary contracts invest less in training compared to 
workers with long-term contracts. 
These considerations suggest that when training costs and benefits are 
heterogeneous the efficient level of training can vary across different groups, 
without any implication for under-provision.  With perfectly competitive labor 
markets, there is under-provision of training if individuals are liquidity constrained 
(problems related to the capital market) or if there are legal constraints, such as 
minimum wages, which do not allow workers to accept a sufficiently low initial 
wage. Under-provision also emerges when individuals are not fully rational or 
perfectly informed, for instance because they are too “present-oriented” (high 
discount rate) or short-sighted to the point of not being able to perceive the 
benefits of training in terms of future earnings. These problems might be more 
relevant for certain groups of workers than for others. For example, low-income 
workers might be particularly affected by credit constraints, or might be unable to 
collect information about training returns. 
Additional problems emerge if returns to training are uncertain, either 
because of shocks to the demand of particular competencies or because of 
uncertainty about the ability to acquire a certain qualification or skill level. Since 
workers are unlikely to obtain insurance against these types of risk they may be 
discouraged to invest in training (Layard, Robinson and Steedman, 1995).  
 
1.1.1. Renegotiation  
 
With perfectly competitive labor markets, an inefficient level of training can 
also occur if renegotiation between the parties takes place after the investment. 
When labor contracts cannot be committed upon ex-ante, renegotiation after the 
investment reduces the ex-ante incentive to invest (hold up). These problems of 
opportunism have been considered both in relation to specific investments 
(Williamson, 1975; Hashimoto, 1981; Prendergast, 1993; Kahn and Huberman, 
1988; MacLeod and Malcomson, 1993) and in relation to investments in general   9
human capital financed by workers (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999a; Malcomson, 
Maw and McCormick, 2000).  
Renegotiation by the employer discourages workers to invest in firm-specific 
skills, since these skills have no value outside the firm that currently employs 
them. This hold-up problem may be solved by reputation mechanisms or by 
contractual forms such as ‘up-or-out’ practices (Kahn and Huberman, 1988) and 
’up-or-stay’ promotion rules (Prendergast, 1993). Up-or-out contracts establishing 
that after an initial training period the firm must decide whether to “promote” the 
worker – and to award him a higher wage – or to fire him, guarantee efficient 
provision. If the wage paid after the training period is larger than the productivity 
of an untrained worker and smaller than the productivity of a trained one, the firm 
will be interested in promoting only those workers who invested in training. 
Nevertheless, if workers are heterogeneous and choose different levels of 
investment, it could be convenient for the firm to fire the workers who invested 
too little. This behavior may prevent the realization of efficient investment. 
Problems emerge also with up-or-stay contracts, which establish that workers who 
invest will be promoted while those who do not invest will retain their initial 
position, since their feasibility depends both on whether firms can attach wages to 
tasks and on whether the production technology allows the credible assignment of 
workers to tasks.  
Investment in general human capital financed by the worker can induce firms 
to be opportunistic in their effective provision of training level and quality. Since 
training activities are characterized by imperfect observability and verifiability, 
their provision generates a classical moral hazard problem: the firm is tempted to 
pocket the wage reduction accepted by the worker without providing the 
contracted training or by  supplying low quality training. Acemoglu and Pischke 
(1999a) argue that this problem may explain why the financing of general 
training is carried out by firms rather than by workers. They maintain that: “many 
skills are best learned by on-the-job training, combining production, learning-by-
doing, and mentoring by more experienced colleagues. However, the employment 
relation gives the control over the worker's time to his employer. It is therefore   10
possible for a firm to pay a low wage with a training promise, and then use the 
worker in regular production activities. This possibility could be avoided if what 
constitutes training were easily observed by courts, so that employment contracts 
could unambiguously specify the training obligations of the employer. 
Nevertheless, since important parts of the training program are intangible, 
involving mentoring, advice and practice, it is quite hard to specify them in 
advance and monitor the firm's compliance in individual cases. […] We therefore 
view the contracting difficulties between firms and workers as an additional 
constraint on workers' ability to buy training in the workplace” [Acemoglu and 
Pischke, 1999a, p. 118].
 
Referring to the difficulty of verifying training activities, Malcomson, Maw and 
McCormick, 2000, argue that, since workers are imperfectly informed and firms 
are heterogeneous with respect to training costs, a problem of adverse selection 
might emerge, so that firms with high training costs might pocket the wage 
reductions accepted by workers without fulfilling their training promises, thereby 
discouraging workers from investing in human capital, even in the absence of 
capital market imperfections.  
De Paola and Scoppa, 2001, show that with up-or-out contracts the firm’s 
incentive to cheat on the provision of training is restrained by the cost it will incur 
in having to fill a new vacancy following its separation from the worker. Since this 
cost depends on labor market conditions, the interest in cheating when labor 
markets are tight is limited. On the o ther hand, firms have little incentive to 
honestly provide training in markets characterized by a high level of 
unemployment. 
In addition, difficulties in measuring and verifying human capital investment 
may aggravate the conflicting interests of employers and employees concerning 
the type of skills (general or specific) to be provided (Stevens, 1994; Barron et 
al., 1997). Workers might be discouraged to invest in human capital since they 
are skeptical about the skills provided by the firm being sufficiently general to 
ensure a high productivity and wages in other firms. 
   11
1.2. Imperfectly competitive labor markets 
 
New sources of inefficiency have recently been stressed by a number of 
papers, which consider training when labor markets are not perfectly competitive. 
In this environment, firms may be willing to bear some or all the costs of 
providing general training if the increase of productivity induced by training is 
higher than the wage increase, that is, if there is wage compression. The 
divergence between productivity and wages as firms invest in training might arise 
for several reasons, including mobility costs, search and matching frictions, the 
complementarity between general and specific skills, and asymmetric information. 
As reviewed by Leuven, 2002, we can distinguish between two cases of 
information asymmetries: first, the training firm is better informed than the 
market about the skills of its employees. Second, the training firm is better 
informed about the abilities of its workers, which gives rise to adverse selection. 
All these imperfections reduce the outside option of workers investing in training. 
As shown by Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2003, they turn general 
skills into de facto specific skills. 
Since the existence of labor market imperfections precludes the possibility that 
the investing individual can reap the full returns of her investment, there is scope 
for under-investment in human capital. It is important to notice that the firm’s 
monopsonistic power might differ across different types of workers. For example, 
some workers might be more affected by adverse selection problems or, due to 
the type of tasks they manage, might have a more firm-specific human capital. 
Better educated workers can also have highly dispersed abilities  – because 
acquiring education not only improves skills but also makes them more variable - 
which, in the case of adverse selection problems, translate into lower outside 
options and in a higher incentive for firms to invest in their human capital. Booth 
and Zoega, 2000, show that firms’ incentives to invest in general training are 
increasing in task complexity. Workers’ heterogeneous observable innate ability 
affects the variety of tasks, which can be performed within a firm and generates 
monopsony power to firms with a ‘better’ workforce. Since the degree of   12
monopsony power is increasing in task complexity, firms with a workforce 
involved in more sophisticated tasks are more willing to finance general training. 
 
1.2.1. Turnover and poaching 
 
Employees  with higher turnover rates are less likely to receive employer 
provided training. In addition, (general) training itself can increase turnover by 
increasing productivity in other firms. Since general training often benefits future 
employers, who in imperfect labor markets do not pay for the full marginal 
product of workers, the level of investment undertaken by the current firm cannot 
be optimal. If quit rates are positive and firms in the market pay less than 
productivity, outside firms earn a profit from training, which is not considered by 
training firms when deciding whether to invest. This poaching externality reduces 
the incentive to train (see Stevens, 1996; Katz and Zidermann, 1990)
1.  
To illustrate, assume that firms are identical and that individuals live and work 
for two periods. Training takes place during the first period, when both 
productivity and wages are equal to zero. Productivity and wages in the second 
period are denoted respectively by y and w. For the sake of simplicity, we assume 
a discount factor equal to one and that the investment is totally financed by the 
employer. Optimality requires choosing an amount of training such as any further 
increase in investment would imply a marginal increase in output smaller than the 
corresponding marginal increase in costs: 
 
         ( ) ( ) s c s y
' ' =                     [1] 
 
                                                 
1  The view that turnover might generate under-provision of training when firms invest is not 
shared by Moen and Rosen, 2002, who argue that efficiency can be preserved if firms and workers 
are able to write long-term contracts and to contract efficiently. This is interesting in principle but 
questionable in practice.  
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Privately optimal training investment s is decided by each firm in the market to 
maximize the following profit function, where q  is the exogenous probability of 
separation 
 
        ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) s c s w s y q - - - ) 1 (                  [2] 
 
Therefore profit maximization implies choosing a level of training such as the 
increase in returns, which occur only with probability (1-q), is equal to the 
increase in costs: 
 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) s c s w s y q
' ' ' ) 1 ( = - -                 [3] 
 
where the primes are for first derivatives, that is the marginal increase in 
productivity and costs induced by a marginal increase in the training investment. 
The comparison of [1] and [3] shows that each firm in this market under-invests 
in training if  ( ) 0
' > s w  - that is if wages increase with training - because it cannot 
reap all the returns to the training investment. Moreover, training is negatively 
affected by the probability of quitting q>0 and by poaching, which occurs when 
the productivity after training at the new firm is higher than the outside option. 
Let now suppose that both the firm and the worker invest in training and let 
the share of training costs born by the employee be  ( ) 1 , 0 ˛ s . We also assume that 
the wage paid to the trained worker is equal to  ) ( ) ( s y s w b = . While the first best 
still require that [1] holds, the firm’s choice is given by the condition 
 
        ( ) ( )( ) [ ] ( ) s c s y q
' ' ) 1 ( 1 1 s b - = - -               [4] 
 
and the worker’s choice satisfies  
 
        ) ( ) (
' ' s c s y s b =                     [5]  
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Since the total marginal returns of training of both the firm and the worker are 
equal to  ( ) ( ) [ ] b - - 1 1
' q s y , the efficient solution can be reached either with q=0, or 
with ß=1. In the latter case the employee bears all the costs and reaps all the 
returns to training. Therefore, s must be equal to 1 and we are back to Becker’s 
case. In the unlikely case where  1 0 < = < s b , the worker has an incentive to 
invest efficiently but the firm still under-invests. The reason is that turnover, by 
creating positive training externalities, generates under-investment in general 
training (Acemoglu, 1997)
2.  
With investing firms, training is lower than the first best, and lower than [4], 
if employees are more likely to quit after training, that is  ( ) 0 ' > s q , perhaps 
because their attained higher competencies increase their outside option, or if 
training increases the probability that trained workers find a new job after losing 
or leaving their current job. Since a higher re-employment probability increases 
the reservation wage and the worker’s bargaining power, firms may be less 
willing to invest. The hazard rate from unemployment and the risk of poaching 
often varies across local labor markets. Ceteris paribus, we expect that firms 
located in a dense area with a strong industrial specialization have lower incentive 
to train than other firms, because of the higher turnover and poaching threat. 
However, as argued by Brunello and Gambarotto, 2004, and Brunello and De 
Paola, 2004, this local negative effect can be offset if denser areas generate 
positive pooling externalities associated to the flow of new ideas and to 
innovation, and these ideas and skills are complements.
3 
Other authors have suggested that training may reduce separation rates. 
According to Jansen, 1998, skills acquisition in a firm determines not only an 
increase in productivity, but also a reduction in the probability of separation. 
                                                 
2 An alternative view has been offered by Booth and Zoega, 1999, who have argued that when 
there is uncertainty about future productivity, a higher quit rate reduce the importance of future 
flows and the option value of waiting rather than training. 
3  Local economic conditions may influence training also through other channels. According to 
Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999, a high unemployment rate, by reducing wages, induces higher 
training investments by firms. However, since local unemployment also increases the availability 
of skilled employees in the local labor market, it allows firms to save on training costs by directly 
hiring an unemployed worker (see Brunello and Medio 2001, Barron, Black, and Loewenstein 
1989, Stevens 1994).   15
Hence, skilled workers, who can afford higher flexibility, are less subject than 
unskilled workers to separations induced by negative shocks.  
We conclude that, if firms invest in general training, important evidence on 
under-provision can be obtained by looking at t he relationship between 
investment in training and turnover. On the one hand, a positive relationship 
reduces the marginal benefits of training with respect to the first best, with 
negative effects on training. On the other hand, a negative relationship can 
compensate other sources of under-provision and close or even eliminate the gap 
between efficient and actual training outcomes. 
 
1.2.2. The role of labor market institutions 
 
The interest of firms to finance general skill acquisition by workers is greater 
when, as a result of monopsonistic power, the wage structure is more 
compressed. In the non-competitive labor market approach wage compression 
might be induced by institutional features, such as minimum wages and union 
wage bargaining, with theoretical predictions that are in sharp contrast with those 
derived from Becker’s analysis.  
For example, unionization can improve the commitment on wage contracts and 
reduce the hold up problem, thereby increasing training (Ryan, 1994). Unions 
may encourage training also because they play a relevant role in reducing labor 
turnover (Blau and Kahn, 1983; Freeman and Medoff, 1984, Booth and Chatterji, 
1998). Moreover, if unions are industry wide, they can help internalizing poaching 
externalities (Booth, Francesconi and Zoega, 2003). Similarly, by reducing the 
dispersion of wages between trained and un-trained employees, unions can 
encourage firms to fund general training investments
4.  
                                                 
4 Arulampalam and Booth, 1998, investigate the nexus between work-related training and labor market “flexibility” and suggest that there 
is a trade-off between expanding marginal forms of employment and expanding the proportion of the workforce getting work-related 
training. Therefore, the emphasis on the need to increase flexibility in the labor market might not be compatible with the increase in the 
stock of work-related skills by workers.  
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A subtler view on the positive role of unions has been offered by Bhashkar and 
Holden, 2003, who argue that, if firms cannot differentiate wages within skill 
levels according to ability, perhaps because of unions, the employer can use 
training as a tool to attract and compensate abler workers, who are promoted to 
jobs requiring more sophisticated competences. With restraint on wage 
differentiation, training acts as a screening device. A similar point in the context of 
temporary help firms has been made by Autor, 2001. 
On the negative side, unions may want to push for equality in the provision of 
training, with negative consequences on overall training investment, which goes 
beyond the training of the less advantaged groups. In addition, unions often 
oppose the introduction of new technologies requiring skill up-grading and by so 
doing indirectly oppose training. 
According to Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999, a positive effect on training may 
also derive from minimum wages. Since firms have to pay the minimum wage 
even to their unskilled workers, rents from the employment relationship are 
eroded, and in order to restore such rents firms need to invest in training to 
increase the productivity of less skilled workers. Other authors, for example 
Jansen, 1998, and Fella,  2000, identify a positive relationship between the 
presence of firing costs and the investment in training by firms. Jansen, 1998, 
assumes that training reduces the probability of separation between workers and 
firms and shows that the payment of training costs by firms may represent a 
strategy to reduce turnover and firing costs. Fella considers the effect on training 
produced by institutional regulations, which establish a firing cost to be paid when 
the employment relationship is interrupted. He shows that, since investment in 
general training increases the worker’s productivity outside the training firm, the 
latter might be interested in investing in training to save firing costs in the case of 
dismissals. The reason is that the firing cost is bargained between the parties, 
and is lower the higher the outside option available to the worker. Fella’s model 
predicts a positive correlation between investment in general training and the 
strictness of employment protection rules.  
          17
  1.2.3. Externalities and coordination problems  
 
Another source of under-investment is the co-ordination problems between 
workers and firms, which are often originated by decisions taken before entering 
the labor market. Firms invest in new technologies and workers in human capital, 
and these investments are linked by a complementary relationship: workers’ 
returns to the investment in skills depend upon firms investing in the technology 
which requires these skills, and firms’ returns to investment in the new 
technology depend upon the existence of an adequate supply of skilled workers. 
Scarce human capital generates high costs of posting skilled job vacancies and 
induces firms to employ technologies demanding low skills, which in turn leads to 
workers not investing in training.  
Following this line of reasoning Snower, 1996, models the emergence of low 
skills  -  bad jobs trap characterized by persistent low productivity levels and 
under-investment in training. In this situation the social returns to posting skilled 
job vacancies and investing in training are higher than private returns. This is 
because a skilled job vacancy increases the probability that skilled workers find a 
good job and consequently raises the expected returns to training. On the other 
hand, investing in training increases the probability of filling a skilled vacancy and 
therefore raises the returns of creating skilled jobs. These network externalities 
create the possibility of multiple equilibria that can be ranked according to an 
efficiency criterion: a “high” equilibrium with high job creation and high training, 
and a “low” equilibrium with low job creation and low training. Acemoglu, 1996, 
Redding, 1996, and Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998, also present models with 
multiple equilibria where under-provision of training is one of the possible 
equilibria.  
The presence of network externalities does not necessarily produce multiple 
equilibria. In their model of local labor markets, Brunello and De Paola, 2004 
show that a firm employing a new worker increases economic density in the local 
labor market and the expected profit that other firms can gain from training. 
However, higher density also reduces local unemployment and increases wages.   18
Therefore, a side effect of higher density is that the vacancy - employment rate 
increases, which increases turnover and has a negative impact on training. 
 
2. The under – provision of training: empirical evidence  
 
The empirical literature on training suffers of measurement problems that 
hinder the achievement of ultimate conclusions. Training incidence and duration is 
usually measured using data drawn from household and employer surveys and 
from administrative data of single firms. These data contain self-reported training 
measures, which are affected by measurement errors because respondents may 
not exactly remember all their relevant training experiences, especially when the 
span of time between the training spell and the interview is long. Moreover, 
workers and firms may have different perceptions of training investments. As 
argued by Black e Lynch, 1995, p. 17, “..a supervisor who is assigned to work 
side-by-side with a new employee may view the time she spends with a new hire 
as training, whereas the employee views the fact that the supervisor is always 
hanging around as monitoring, not training”. Barron et al.,1997b, using data from 
a matched employer-employee survey, find that the correlation between worker 
and establishment measures are lower than 0.5 and that establishments report 
on average 25 percent more hours of training than workers do.  
These problems and the fact that informal training is rarely recorded in any 
survey makes it difficult to test human capital theory  – as well as any other 
theory – of training. As far as the under – provision of training is concerned, an 
additional complication is that training costs and returns  - on which efficiency 
evaluations are based - are very difficult to measure. On the one hand, individual 
productivity is hardly ever measured and the wage, which should approximate 
productivity, varies with many other factors, including labor market competition. 
On the other hand, respondents to surveys are unlikely to know the opportunity 
cost of training. When training is financed by the firm and the respondents are 
workers, it is also difficult to assess the direct money cost of training.    19
According to some authors, the under-investment argument finds support in 
the combination of high private rates of return to training and low training 
incidence. Studies by Booth and Bryan, 2002, Frazis and Loewenstein, 1999, 
Aralampalam, Booth and Elias, 1997, Mincer, 1996, Blanchflower and Lynch, 
1994, suggest that private rates of return to training are considerably higher than 
the real rate of return of corporate bonds – 4 percent - and to schooling - about 
5-10 percent (Bishop, 1996). Frazis and Lowenstein find that 40 hours of training 
increase the wages of persons with low levels of tenure and experience by 8 
percent, as much as a single year of education. Carneiro and Heckman, 2003, 
report that the return to private sector training in the US ranges between 16 and 
26 percent. Evidence that the private returns to training are disproportionately 
high relative to other investments with similar risk suggests that there is some 
market failure, which prevents individuals from implementing their privately 
optimal plans. According to Lengermann, 1996, s ince workers generally do not 
experience reductions in wage rates or hours worked while they received 
company training, their private rate of return to training tends to be infinite. This 
might explain the large numbers of American, Canadian, Dutch and Swedish 
workers reporting that they are unable to get all the training they would like 
(Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1999).  
The association of high returns to market failures, however, is problematic. 
Assuming that the marginal returns to training decrease with the stock invested, 
high observed returns are consistent both with the presence of liquidity 
constraints, which keep some individuals from investing, and with high marginal 
costs of training. While the former explanation supports under-provision, the 
latter explanation is perfectly in line with efficient provision.  
In the case of imperfect labor markets, with firms bearing part or all the 
costs of training, evidence for under-investment may be gathered by looking at 
separation rates after training. As shown by equations [4] and [5], a p ositive 
value of ß – which measures the share of the productivity gain appropriated by 
the employee –reduces the investment by the firm and increases the investment 
by the employee, with a negative overall effect on training. The intuition for the   20
negative effect is that, while the employee can capture her share of the returns to 
training in the labor market, the employer who invests can only capture her share 
with probability (1-q). Hence, the essential reason for under-provision is not that 
ß is positive, but that the turnover rate is different from zero, which creates a 
poaching externality. 
Therefore, a preliminary step in the investigation of the under-investment 
problem is to clarify the competitive structure of the labor market. There is 
substantial evidence that the costs of training are financed by the employer, 
which can be read as an indicator of monopsony power (Barron, Berger and 
Black, 1999; Booth and Bryan, 2002; Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1998; Stevens, 
1999). The willingness of firms to bear training costs could be due, however, to 
the firm  – specific nature of the investment rather than to market power. The 
available empirical evidence suggests that skills provided by (formal) on-the-job 
training are seldom purely firm-specific (Neal 1995, Stevens 1994, 1999, 
Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1999), which points again to labor market 
imperfections. As documented by Bishop, 1997, a growing number of firms are 
training their workers in completely general skills such as mathematics, reading, 
writing, problem solving and interpersonal skills. Similarly, OECD, 2003a, reports 
that courses occurring outside the workplace impart essentially general skills. 
The fact that firms formally pay for training does not imply that workers do not 
bear part of the cost through lower wages. When workers invest, we should 
observe a positive relationship between wage premia and training. A number of 
papers, investigating the relationship between training and wage compression, do 
not support this claim (Brunello, 2004; Ericson, 2004; Beckman, 2004; Almeida-
Santos and Mumford, 2003; Croce and Ghignoni 2004). Bassanini and Brunello, 
2004, use data from the European Community Household Panel and measure the 
training wage premium - for different sub-groups of the employed population - as 
the differential between the median wage growth of trained and untrained   21
employees. Their evidence clearly suggests a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between general training and wage compression.
5  
Moreover, empirical work using methods that control for the self – selection of 
individuals to treatment leads to positive but low estimated returns for training; 
see Bassanini, 2004, for the OECD, Pischke, 2000, for Germany, and Goux and 
Maurin, 1998, for France. Training returns not significantly different from zero are 
found by Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2002, who estimate the wage returns to work-
related training by restricting the group of untreated individuals to those who 
were willing to receive training in the Netherlands, but did not do so due to some 
random event.    
In case of firms paying for general training, under-provision can occur 
because of involuntary or voluntary turnover. To investigate this aspect we use 
the 7 waves (1995-2001) of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) 
for 12 European countries. The ECHP is a longitudinal survey modeled on the US 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). This survey provides a wealth of 
information on individual income and socio-economic characteristics for all EU 
countries and aims to be representative both in cross-sections and longitudinally. 
Due to the common questionnaire, the information contained in the ECHP is, in 
principle, comparable across countries, which is its main strength. The data 
collection for the ECHP is made at the national level by National Data Collection 
Units (NDUs), with Eurostat providing centralized support and coordination. 
  The main question on vocational training in the ECHP is as follows "Have you 
at any time since January (year before the survey year) been in any vocational 
education or training, including part-time and short-courses?". From this 
question, we construct a dichotomous variable "training participation", which 
takes value 1 if the individual responded "yes" and 0 if she responded "no". 
Conditional on a positive answer, the individual is asked to report whether the 
received training was paid for or organized by the employer. We consider only 
individuals aged between 17 and 65. 
                                                 
5 The use of instrumental variables implies that findings by Bassanini and Brunello (2004) can be 
interpreted as evidence of a true casual relationship between wage premia and training.   22
The ECHP dataset includes also two interesting questions on turnover 
behavior: first, workers are asked to indicate the year they stopped working in 
their previous job. Second, they are asked to indicate the reason of separation, 
which includes obtaining a more suitable job. We select the individuals who in the 
1995 wave indicated that they had received employer provided training from 
January 1994 to the time of the survey and follow them in the next waves to find 
out whether they quitted their last job. To avoid obvious endogeneity problems, 
we only consider separations taking place in 1996 or later and compute both the 
percentage of trained individuals who separated in 1996 and the percentage that 
separated from 1996 to 2001. Moreover, we distinguish between all separations, 
whatever the reason, and separations motivated by better economic conditions. 
Table 1 shows the results by country. We find that the separation rate is 
particularly high in Denmark and the UK, and low in Italy and Spain. Figure 1 
illustrates the relationship between training and separations and suggests  a 
positive correlation between these variables. We further investigate this issue by 
estimating for the sample of 11 countries a probit model of the probability of 
separation between year t+1 and t+s as a function of standard covariates and of 
a dummy indicating whether the individual has received employer  – provided 
training from year t-1 to year t. When we allow s to be higher than 1 and look at 
separations taking place over an extended period of time, there is evidence (see 
Table 3) that having received employer-provided training significantly increases 
the probability of separation, especially if it is to a more suitable job.  
The pooled estimates in Table 2 do not reveal the cross-country heterogeneity 
in the relationship between training and separation. As shown by Table 4, where 
we only report the estimated coefficient of the training dummy from country 
specific regressions, there is evidence of a statistically significant and positive 
relationship between employer  – provided training and subsequent turnover for 
Denmark, Belgium, France and the UK. In the remaining countries the relationship 
is either not statistically significant or negative and statistically significant, as in 
the case of Finland.   23
The evidence that in no country, except Finland, training significantly decreases 
the quit rate is suggestive of under-provision.
6 However, we admit that the 
underlying assumption that firms pay for training requires further investigation.   
Indirect evidence about the negative effects of turnover on training is provided 
by Brunello and Gambarotto, 2004 and Brunello and De Paola, 2004, who 
investigate how spatial agglomeration affects employer - provided training in the 
local labor markets of the UK and Italy. Dense labor markets, with more workers 
and more firms, present better opportunities to locate a better job than sparse 
labor markets, and are characterized by a higher risk of poaching. Local density, 
however, presents also advantages for training firms, because it generates 
positive knowledge spillovers. Brunello and Gambarotto use the UK data from the 
European Community Household Panel for the period 1994-2000 and show that 
employer-provided training is less frequent in economically denser areas. Their 
result is confirmed by Brunello and De Paola, who u se data from a sample of 
Italian manufacturing firms.  
 
2.1 The influence of labor market institutions 
 
As discussed in Section 1, when firms have some monopsonistic power a 
number of new factors need to be considered for the evaluation of training 
investments. A large empirical literature has been devoted to test the influence of 
labor market institutions, such as the presence of unions and of wage bargaining, 
minimum wages and employment protection, on training provision (Grossberg and 
Sicilian, 1999; Neumark and Wascher, 2000; Acemoglu e Pischke, 2003; 
Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan, 2002; Bassanini and Brunello, 2004). As 
discussed below, the results of this research are not clear-cut.  
Starting from the effect of minimum wages on training, the available empirical 
evidence is rather inconclusive, with recent studies on the United States and the 
                                                 
6  Different conclusions are obtained by Parent (1999), who, using a proportional hazard model, 
reports a negative effect of training with the current employer on separations in US. However, 
since the author controls for fixed effects without controlling for match -specific effects, these 
results do not seem conclusive.    24
United Kingdom reporting contradictory findings. We recall that in case of perfect 
labor market competition, according to the Beckerian theory the introduction of a 
minimum wage reduces training since some workers will not be able to finance 
training by accepting lower wages. On the contrary, when labor markets are 
characterized by monopsonistic power, minimum wages may increase training for 
low paid workers (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999; Stevens, !994).    
Early research by Mincer and Leighton, 1981, and Hashimoto, 1982, found that 
age-earnings profiles were significantly flatter among workers whose wages were 
bound by the minimum wage, which was interpreted as suggesting that an 
increase in the minimum wage significantly reduces on-the-job training.  Sharply 
in contrast, Lazear and Miller, 1981, did not find a statistically significant 
relationship between the slope of age-earnings profiles and an indicator of 
whether the minimum wage was binding or not. However, more recent research 
by Grossberg and Sicilian, 1999, has shown that the effect of minimum wages on 
wage growth could be unrelated to the effect produced on training. As suggested 
by Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999, minimum wages eliminate the lower tail of the 
wage distribution and by so doing flatten the slope of the age-earning profile. This 
effect is independent of the impact of minimum wages on training. Leighton and 
Mincer, 1981, and Neumark and Wascher, 2001, u sing data on individual 
workers, consider the relationship between the variation of minimum wages 
across US states and the investment in training and find that the more binding is 
the minimum wage, the less likely is a worker to receive on-the-job training. 
Since the minimum wage variable used by Neumark and Wascher is at a higher 
level of aggregation than training, the estimated standard errors may understate 
the inaccuracy of the estimates. This problem is taken into account by Acemoglu 
and Pischke, 1999, who, by focusing on workers affected by minimum wages 
changes, find no evidence that minimum wages reduce training. At a more 
descriptive level, this result is confirmed by inspection of Figure 2, where we plot 
for 11 European countries the average percentage of trained individuals over the 
years 1995-1996 against the Kaitz index in 1995, computed as the ratio of the   25
minimum wage to the average wage7.  Since training incidence can depend on 
the industrial composition of each country, we use in the figure the predicted 
probability of training from a probit regression, which controls for education, 
gender, industry, firm size and public sector effects. Schiller, 1994, and 
Grossberg and Sicilian, 1999, adopt indicators of whether minimum wages are 
binding or n ot that vary with the individual worker. These two studies find 
opposite results: Schiller produces evidence that minimum wages reduce training, 
but Grossberg and Sicilian do not. Their approach, however, may be biased 
because the omitted determinants of training can also be correlated with their 
indicator of whether minimum wages are binding. Arulampalam, Booth and 
Bryan, 2004, use two different treatment groups, workers stating that they were 
affected by minimum wages and workers with a wage in 1998 below the 
minimum. Their study of British Household Panel Survey data finds no evidence 
that the introduction of the minimum wage in Britain in 1999 has reduced the 
training of treated workers. If anything, there is evidence that training has 
increased.
8  
A few studies investigate the relationship between training incidence, union 
coverage in collective bargaining and union density, with mixed results. Barron et 
al., 1987, use data from a survey of US employers and find that the proportion of 
non-supervisory workers in the firm covered by collective bargaining has a 
significant negative effect on total training. Earlier work by Duncan and Stafford, 
1980, and Mincer, 1983, produce similar results. On the contrary, Lynch, 1992, 
finds evidence of a positive effect o f unions on training in the US National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). Similarly, Kennedy et al., 1994, find that 
                                                 
7 Source: Nickell and Layard (1999). 
8 These diverging results may depend on the fact that in countries where the minimum wage is 
high it might be difficult to find a control group which is not directly or indirectly affected by the 
minimum wage. Conversely, in countries where the minimum wage is particularly low, the 
incidence of training in the treatment group is likely to be extremely small, since training is 
relatively infrequent at the bottom of the wage distribution. For the purpose of welfare evaluation 
it is also important to notice that minimum wages, by reducing employment, m ay reduce learning 
by doing and therefore can have a negative effect on human capital accumulation. As shown by 
Baker, 2003, this negative effect is not compensated by higher investments in education. 
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Australian firms where unions are actively involved in bargaining have 
significantly higher training incidence, in spite of the fact that union density does 
not have statistically significant effects. Green, 1993, shows that unions in Britain 
have significant positive effects on training in small firms but virtually no effect in 
large firms. A positive union effect has been found also by B ooth 1991; 
Greenhalgh and Mavrotas 1992; Arulampalam and Booth, 1998; Green, Machin 
and Wilkinson 1999, Booth, Francesconi and Zoega, 2003.  
At a more descriptive level, Figure 3 plots average predicted training incidence 
by country, computed as in Figure 2, against union density. We detect a positive 
relationship, which is driven however by two countries, Denmark and Finland, 
with their high unionization rates and training incidence. Finally, Figure 4 plots 
average predicted training incidence by country against the index of employment 
protection. The negative correlation between these two variables does not 
confirm the view that the presence of high firing costs should encourage firms 
and workers to invest in training.  One possible explanation is that high 
employment protection increases the outside option of insiders and therefore 
raises wages and reduces profits. In these circumstances, firms may have lower 
incentives to train. A complementary explanation has been offered by 
Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan, 2004, who argue that, in economies where 
permanent workers have high levels of employment protection, temporary 
contracts can provide a mechanism enhancing labor market flexibility. Since fixed 
term contracts are short, firms and employees have fewer incentives to invest in 
training. The combination of high employment protection, which increases the 
outside option of insiders, and fixed term contracts, could generate less training 




Training plays an important role in the European strategy for higher 
employment and competitiveness, as documented in a number of European 
Council resolutions, including the Luxembourg and the Lisbon agreements. The   27
design of policies aimed at reducing the under-provision of training requires that 
the causes of under-provision be identified. It is particularly important to 
understand whether the relatively low provision of training is due to the firm or to 
the employee. For instance, the implementation of policies, which aim at 
removing liquidity constraints, should be based on hard evidence that these 
constraints are important. In Section 2 we have reviewed evidence showing that 
firms provide and pay for training, both general and specific. We have also 
argued that the positive relationship between training and wage compression is 
evidence that labor markets are not perfectly competitive. At the same time, we 
are not aware of any convincing evidence that under-provision is due to the 
presence of liquidity constraints. In many countries capital markets are far from 
being perfect, but there is not enough evidence enabling us to argue that these 
imperfections have serious implication for training investment.9  
When labor markets are imperfectly competitive, the supply of training by 
firms is higher than in perfect competition, because wage compression increases 
profits. On the other hand, the demand for training by employees is lower than in 
perfect competition, because the wage gain from training is lower. As argued by 
Stevens, 2000, the fall in demand outweighs the increase in supply, because the 
employer gains only if the employee stays on. Therefore, training is lower than in 
the first best allocation even in absence of liquidity constraints.  
Policies, which aim at increasing the level of training above the market level, 
should be designed to affect either supply or demand, or both. In this review, we 
focus on supply policies, which directly affect firms but also have repercussions 
on the demand side. Broadly speaking, supply policies can affect employer  – 
provided training at the margin if they influence marginal benefits and marginal 
costs, as shown by equation [4] in Section 1 of this review. Therefore, we find it 
convenient to organize our discussion in two parts, by classifying training policies 
as policies targeted to marginal benefits and policies targeted at marginal costs.  
 
                                                 
9 The relevance of credit constraints seems week also for investments in education, see for 
example Carneiro and Heckman (2002).   28
Clearly framework conditions play an important role in influencing both 
training investment by workers and firms and the effectiveness of policies aimed 
at encouraging this kind of investment. In previous section has been discussed 
the relevance of labour market institutions such as minimum wages, unions and 
employment protection legislation and other features that lead to imperfect 
labour markets. A first best approach would be that of implementing structural 
reforms that help to re-establishing  perfect labour market competition. However, 
as noticed by OECD (2003a), these reforms do not concern primarily training and 
their evaluation cannot be done without considering all the relevant trade-offs.  
 
 
  3.1 Policies targeted at marginal benefits 
 
 
  The marginal benefits of training to the employer are influenced by the 
productivity of training, labor turnover, the degree of wage compression and the 
inter-temporal discounting rate. Therefore, policies, which aim at increasing 
returns, should try to influence these variables, both by affecting structural and 
framework conditions and by direct targeting.  
  Institutions regulating labor and product markets can affect the provision of 
training. For example, policies, which increase labor market flexibility and favor 
the diffusion of temporary contracts can reduce the incentive to train because, as 
discussed in Section 2, returns accrue to the parties for a shorter span of time 
(Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan, 2004). Training can instead be encouraged by 
policies, which enhance cooperation among firms, such as anti-head-hunting 
cartels (Wakita, 1998), or favor the development of social norms conducive to a 
compressed wage structure (Akerlof - Yellen, 1990) and to voluntary restraints of 
poaching behavior (Finegold and Soskice, 1998; Soskice, 1994, Lynch, 1994).  
  The complementarity between training, technological change and education 
suggests that higher investment in training can be obtained as a by-product of 
policies designed to encourage innovative activities and educational attainment. 
Localization policies can also affect training by favoring the development of 
positive pooling externalities and knowledge spillovers. These policies, however,   29
may also encourage turnover, which has negative effects on the incentive to 
invest in training. Finally, macroeconomic policies, which reduce the rate of 
interest and/or reduce the degree of uncertainty in the stream of future revenues 
have also positive implications for training. 
  Policies targeted directly at affecting the benefits of training include payback 
clauses and apprenticeship contracts. Both influence the benefits of training by 
affecting labor market turnover. Starting from apprenticeships, these contracts 
combine training and employment in a way, which enables people entering an 
occupation to develop skills and competencies specific to a particular job or 
sector. A feature of apprentice contracts is that training is co-financed by firms 
and workers. The reason is that apprentices are paid less than their productivity 
for the duration of the contract, and receive a substantial wage increase upon 
completion of the specified training period. By so doing, the firm can recoup part 
of the cost  of training. The design of the contract is such that the (certified) 
qualification is awarded only at the end of the apprenticeship spell, which 
discourages workers from leaving before expected. At the same time, the 
commitment to pay a higher wage after training to retained employees reduces 
opportunistic behavior on the firm side.  Malcomson, Maw and McCormick, 2003, 
show that regulations, which increase the length of the apprenticeship contract, 
accompanied by a subsidy for completed spells, can help in reaching an efficient 
level of training. Needless to say, these schemes work if employees who leave the 
firm before the end of the contract suffer a cost
10. The cost is higher when the 
qualification awarded at the end of the apprenticeship is highly valued in the labor 
market. Ceteris paribus, this requires an adequate system of certification of skills.  
On the one hand, the formal certification of acquired skills can be used to 
induce trainees to contribute to the cost of investing in training, because of the 
higher returns they can reap in the labor market. On the other hand, certification 
reduces asymmetric information, increases turnover and discourages firms from 
investing. While the supply of training falls, the demand increases, with uncertain 
                                                 
10 Rules imposed by the medieval guilds against workers leaving before completion of the 
apprenticeship have served this scope.   30
effects  on overall provision. These rather pessimistic conclusions change, 
however, if we take into account that the effectiveness of training is strictly 
influenced by the active participation of recipients. Acemoglu and Pischke, 2000, 
show that certification, by guaranteeing workers a higher wage, induces them to 
provide a high level of effort in the skill acquisition process. This may explain why 
firms in countries like Germany contribute in a substantial way to the general 
training of their apprentices even in the presence of formal certifications, which 
increase the portability of acquired skills at the end of the training period. 
Training agreements such as payback clauses also require certification and 
the monitoring of employer – provided training. These agreements are essentially 
devices, which encourage firms to undertake the costs associated to training 
programs and impose a penalty on workers who quit within a certain period. 
These schemes help in solving two kind of problems: first, they reduces the risk 
of poaching, since workers are induced to stay with the firm providing training; 
second, they allow workers to invest in training even if they are credit 
constrained, because the employer is willing to anticipate training costs.  
Legal frameworks, which establish and permit pay-back clauses in individual 
contracts or collective agreements are present in many European countries. Their 
practical diffusion, however, is limited, perhaps because it is difficult to contract 
upon the contents of training.
11 Policies aimed at improving accreditation 
systems, which can effectively signal learning outcomes to the labor market, 
would play an important role in encouraging individuals to pay or to share the 




  3.2 Policies targeted at marginal costs 
 
  Since training is an intangible activity, difficult to quantify and monitor, 
policies that subsidize private or public providers are affected by the opportunistic 
                                                 
11 Moreover, the penalty imposed on the trainee in the event of exit needs to be neither too low, 
otherwise quits cannot be discouraged, nor too high, otherwise workers will not accept the 
training contract. 
12 For a discussion of these kind of policies see OECD (2003a).   31
behavior of the parties, with negative consequences on the quality of the 
investment. This problem is particularly serious when training is completely 
financed by an external agent, who has to motivate both the provider and the 
recipient to behave efficiently. Rather than full financing, co-financing schemes 
are both a better tool for the provision of adequate incentives to employees and 
training providers and a way to deal with scarce public resources. Co-financing 
implies that the government pays only part of the training cost, which is also born 
in part by the employer and the employee who invest. 
In this sub-section we discuss levy/grant schemes, train or pay schemes and 
tax deductions. Levy/grant schemes combine a tax levied on all firms – normally 
on payroll – with grants awarded to training projects presented by some firms.  
If the burden of the tax is entirely on employees, net wages fall to 
compensate for the tax. If in addition the subsidy received by successful firms 
reduces in the same proportion the share of the training costs borne by trainees, 
this policy has no impact on employers but affect the training decisions of 
employees, with some redistribution from employees not receiving training to 
employees receiving it (Stevens, 2001). This conclusion is rather strong and 
requires both that employers are able to shift the burden of the tax entirely on 
employees and that employees can entirely appropriate the advantages of the 
subsidies in terms of a lower training price. If the second condition does not hold, 
and the price of training paid by employees remains constant, this policy does 
reduce the marginal costs of training faced by the employers receiving grants, 
with positive effects on employer – provided training. A correct evaluation of the 
impact of a levy / grant policy therefore requires information on the 
responsiveness o f wages and training prices to changes in payroll taxes and 
training grants. 
If the purpose of the levy/grant scheme is to reduce the poaching 
externality, taxes should be levied on profits rather than on wages. The intuitive 
reason is that the externality is driven by the profits from poaching and that 
these profits are not reduced by payroll taxes if the burden is entirely shifted onto   32
wages. The advantage of the tax on profits is that it affects the marginal decision 
between training and poaching by reducing the profits from poaching. 
Levy/grant schemes are fairly widespread within the European Union, and 
details are provided by OECD, 2003. One issue is who decides on the grants, the 
government - as in Denmark - or the social parties – as in Spain and in Italy. In 
the second case the active role of unions can help monitoring training quality and 
the design of training curricula with an eye to the portability of skills (see Ok and 
Tergeist, 2003). In any case, since grants are awarded on a case by case system 
both high procedural costs and risk of abuses need to be considered. It is also 
important to notice that awarded grants typically involving the funding of a fixed 
percentage of training costs or total costs up to a certain ceiling, are similar 
respectively to tax deductions and train or pay schemes, which, as explained 
below, may produce deadweight losses.  
An alternative to the combination of levies and grants is “train or pay” 
schemes, with levies payable only if the training investment falls below a legal 
minimum. France is a typical example, with the Loi du 16 juillet 1971, which 
introduced a minimum training expenditure and required firms to pay a levy equal 
to the difference between the minimum and actual investment (OECD, 1993). A 
typical criticism raised against this scheme is that it can produce deadweight 
losses. (Ziderman, 1990). This scheme can be decomposed into a tax on payroll 
and a subsidy on training such that the net tax is equal to zero when the 
minimum required amount is attained. If firms can shift the payroll tax onto 
workers, the employer’s benefits from training are not affected but the training 
subsidy shifts the marginal training cost downwards, thereby encouraging the 
provision of training by firms. With full shifting, however, the net wage falls, 
which reduces the demand for training by employees: the overall effect depends 
on the relative shifts of demand and supply. With no shifting, the employer’s 
marginal net benefits from training are reduced when training is above the 
minimum requirement, but employees are unaffected. Deadweight losses emerge 
also for firms that would have spent less than the legal minimum. In fact, this   33
system by driving marginal costs to zero, overpays the increase in training it 
induces.  
Compared to levy/grant policies, train or pay schemes imply that firms do 
not have to apply for grants in order to fund their training projects. Where 
bureaucratic costs are high and public procedures slow, this could be an 
important advantage (Geber, 1993). A potential minus is that firms could use 
training as a perquisite with cosmetic rather than substantial effects on skill 
development. Another minus is that training decisions are decentralized, with 
limited opportunities for coordination and the development of national or sectoral 
training policies.  
An open question is whether levy rates should vary across sectors. Training 
costs vary among industries and there is no agreement on whether levy rates 
should reflect these differences. Even if they should, it is questionable whether a 
differentiated policy can be implemented when some of the costs are not 
verifiable. If efficiency were the issue, a sector specific policy would require that 
the government have information on the sector  – specific efficient level of 
training. 
The last policy option is tax deductions from turnover, which allow firms to 
deduct some or all training costs and thereby to reduce corporate taxes. Tax 
deductions can be higher than 100 percent of total expenses, as in the case of 
Italy of the Netherlands. As in the case of train or pay levies, this policy does not 
distinguish between marginal and infra-marginal costs, and is therefore open to 
the same criticism: some of the training is subsidized even though firms would 
have invested anyway. An additional problem is that deductions work only as long 
as there are positive profits. One way to get around this is to allow firms to carry 
forward these expenses to fiscal years where profits are positive  – see the 
detailed description on OECD, 2003. 
All these p olicies are motivated by under-provision, that is, by a level of 
training below the efficient level. A different issue is the equitable distribution of 
training opportunities. Since human capital is an important source of income and 
job satisfaction, an equitable allocation would require some redistribution in favor   34
of groups of individuals who are less likely to be trained. The key question here is 
whether economic policy should try to correct outcomes – differences in training – 
or to modify initial conditions, which produce efficiently different outcomes – for 
instance differences in educational attainment. While important, this issue is 




Training and education have become standard keywords in most policy 
proposals dealing with unemployment, competitiveness and growth. These 
proposals almost unanimously suggest that proper policies should be designed to 
foster more education and more training. Are these proposals well justified on 
economic grounds? The answer is positive if we have evidence that the labor 
market generates under-provision. It is also positive if the efficient distribution of 
training in the economy does not correspond to the distribution, which maximizes 
social welfare.  
This paper has reviewed both the theoretical underpinnings and the empirical 
evidence in support of under-provision of training. While there is little if any 
evidence in support of under-provision because of liquidity constraints to the 
demand side of the market, there is evidence that employers provide and pay for 
general training, and that the provision of skills encourages labor turnover. The 
combination of these two facts suggests that the labor market provides less 
training than optimal.  
The balance of the existing empirical evidence suggests that policy 
discussions should focus on the employer rather than on employees. Therefore, 
we have concluded our review by discussing policies which affect the employer’ 








If we allow for turnover to be affected by training investment, and let  ) (
' s q  be the 
marginal change of turnover induced by training, condition [4] becomes 
  
        ( ) ( )( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) s c s y s q s y q
' ' ' ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( 1 1 1 s b b - = - - - -         [6] 
 
We expect  ) (
' s q  to be positive when training is general and the accumulated skills 
are portable across jobs. On the other hand,  ) (
' s q  is likely to be negative when 
skills are firm – specific and can only be used productively in the training firm. In 
the former case, the marginal benefits of training decline, with negative effects on 
the investment. In the latter case they increase, with positive effects.  
Assuming that the firm invests and bears all training costs, investment is 
efficient even in the presence of turnover if  
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which can be written as  
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so that the first best solution cannot be excluded a priori.  
  If firms cannot commit ex-ante to the wage they will pay to the trained 
worker and wages are set to maximize ex-post profits, a trade-off between high 
wages and low turnover rates emerges. In these circumstances, firms can use 
training as a commitment device to reduce turnover. Therefore, with ex-post 
wage determination, it is not possible to rule out training over-investment. This 
can be seen in equation [6].  
The important point for this review, however, is that when the employer is 
involved in the provision of training – general or specific -  part of the returns are 
appropriated by employees, which reduces the employer’s incentive to invest.   36
Even if employees invest more as a consequence, we expect overall investment 






Table 1. Percentage of individuals who received employer provided training in 
1995 and separated in years 1996 to 2001 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Denmark  30.11  10.98  17.38  5.06 
Belgium  20.33  4.97  12.51  2.10 
France  15.64  3.79  8.72  1.95 
UK  34.04  13.88  19.57  7.36 
Ireland  17.66  7.40  10.47  4.55 
Italy  10.53  2.97  4.97  0.45 
Greece  16.32  6.28  6.72  1.10 
Spain  12.45  3.76  6.66  0.39 
Portugal  18.89  11.75  9.64  3.54 
Austria  21.27  7.68  10.99  2.52 
Column 1: all separations between 1996 and 2001; Column 2: all separations in 
1996; Column (3):  separations to a better paying job between 1996 and 2001; 
Column (4):  separations to a better paying job in 1996. Finland missing because 
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separations to a better job - 1996 to 2001



























































































































Table 2. Probit estimates of the probability of separation in years t+1 to t+s as a 
function of employer provided training in year t 
==================================================================== 
# obs :                 154154      154154      154154      154154    
                         (1)          (2)         (3)         (4) 
==================================================================== 
 
College                 0.0584*    -0.0127      0.0684*    -0.0192   
                       (0.0143)    (0.0119)    (0.0185)    (0.0144)   
 
Married                 0.0724*     0.0729*     0.0237      0.0241~  
                       (0.0119)    (0.0097)    (0.0154)    (0.0116)   
 
gender                  0.1485*     0.0646*     0.1173*     0.0443*  
                       (0.0117)    (0.0095)    (0.0151)    (0.0114)   
 
age                     0.0013     -0.0020      0.0034     -0.0011   
                       (0.0036)    (0.0027)    (0.0047)    (0.0032)   
 
Age squared            -0.0002*    -0.0001*    -0.0002*    -0.0001   
                       (0.0000)    (0.0000)    (0.0001)    (0.0000)   
 
tenure                 -0.0265*    -0.0811*    -0.0363*    -0.0948*  
                       (0.0039)    (0.0030)    (0.0050)    (0.0036)   
 
Tenure squared         -0.0012*     0.0020*    -0.0004      0.0029*  
                       (0.0003)    (0.0002)    (0.0004)    (0.0003)   
 
Job satisfaction       -0.0706*    -0.0884*    -0.0741*    -0.0934*  
                       (0.0042)    (0.0035)    (0.0054)    (0.0041)   
 
Private sector          0.1982*     0.1119*     0.1771*     0.0605*  
                       (0.0203)    (0.0160)    (0.0263)    (0.0190)   
 
Monthly wage            0.0008      0.0002      0.0006      0.0009   
                       (0.0008)    (0.0007)    (0.0010)    (0.0007)   
 
Training                0.0833*     0.0225      0.0576*    -0.0118   
                       (0.0153)    (0.0129)    (0.0199)    (0.0158)   
 
R-sq                    0.082       0.097       0.052       0.064   
=================================================================== 
Note: standard errors in parentheses with p<0.05 = ~, p<0.01 = *. Column 1: separations to a better paying job between 
1996 and 2001; Column 2: separations to a better paying job in 1996; Column (3):  all separations  between 1996 and 
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Table 3. Probit estimates of the probability of separation in years t+1 to t+s as a 
function of employer provided training in year t . By country 
 
  Estimated coefficient of 
the training dummy 
Denmark  0.073^ (0.037) 
Belgium  0.266** (0.070) 
France  0.199** (0.072) 
UK  0.079** (0.030) 
Ireland  -0.073 (0.068) 
Italy  0.053 (0.071) 
Greece  0.000 (0.127) 
Spain  -0.073 (0.064) 
Portugal  -0.166 (0.138) 
Austria  0.033 (0.047) 
Finland  -0.100* (0.045) 
Note: the covariates in these regressions are the same used in Table 3. ^: statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level; *: statistically significant at the 5 percent level; **: 






























































Figure 2. Average training incidence and the Kaitz index. Sources: ECHP and 
Nickell-Layard (1999) 
 





























































Figure 3. Average training incidence and union density. Sources: ECHP and 
Nickell-Layard (1999) 
 










































































Figure 4. Average training incidence and employment protection. Sources: ECHP 
and Nickell-Layard (1999) 
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